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Abstract
   The question of the self, of whether or not there is a core part to us that forms our inner essence or 
absolute nature, has been with us almost since our beginning. For centuries philosophical arguments 
over the self took the form of discussing the nature of the self for its existence was taken to be a given. 
This assumption has been increasingly called into question, however, resulting in the current climate 
in which the absence of a self is presumed. Contrary to this trend Kristján Kristjánsson has recently 
proposed a realist self that allegedly rests upon the emotions, claiming a Humean foundation for his 
account. In the following that claim is called into question through a close examination of Hume’s 
approach to the self in his A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), and an interpretation of Hume’s work 
that diﬀers both from Kristjánsson’s reading and from the traditional reading is oﬀered.
Key words: anti-realist/realist, David Hume, Kristján Kristjánsson, personal identity, the self, 
　　　　　whole person
要　　旨
　自己への問い―つまり、我々の内なる本性もしくは絶対的性質を形成する核心部分が我々にあるか否か
―は、人類とともに始まったと言える。何世紀にもわたって、自己に関する哲学の議論は、自己が存在す
ることを前提に行われ、自己の性質に関する議論という形をとった。ところが、この前提がますます疑問
視された結果、現今の時勢において、自己の不在が推定されるのに至っている。クリスティアン・クリス
ティアンソンはこの潮流に対して感情に基づくとされる現実的自己を提言し、自らの論の基礎をヒューム
に求める。この論文では、ヒューム著『人間本性論』（1739 年）における自己へのアプローチを詳細に検
討することによって、その主張に疑問が投げかけられ、また、クリスティアンソンの見方とも伝統的なそ
れとも異なる解釈が提示される。
キーワード：非実在論的／実在論的、ヒューム、クリスティアンソン、人格的同一性、自己、全人
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1.	 The	self,	personal	identity,	and	whole	persons
 Traditionally the self has been considered to be one’s inner core, the true essence of what one is 
and, typically, immortal in one sense or another, the body’s commanding unit or general headquarters 
that is nevertheless not so strongly associated with the body that it ceases upon the body’s death; 
rather instead it continues on in some manner. This view has understandably had a bumpy ride in 
the modern era, particularly within academic circles in which the currently predominant view of the 
self is to deny that it exists and then from there to attempt to explain (or explain away) that inner 
sense of a ‘me’ with which we are all so familiar and which had previously simply been labeled one’s 
soul. One inﬂuential self-concept in this non-realist vein is Derek Parﬁt’s neo-Lockean account, which 
gives us the self as being one’s psychological connectedness and/or continuance,1  another is Barry 
Dainton’s account which posits the self as our streams of consciousness,2  or Galen Strawson’s account 
which does give the self substance in an almost realist way but only for the duration of an experience, 
meaning that each new experience generates a whole new self.3  On all of these accounts a more long-
lasting, truly realist self is seen as being more or less an illusion. In some ways each of these concepts 
also mirror the standard Buddhist arguments against the existence of a soul4  though it must be noted 
that in the Western philosophical tradition arguments against a realist self have since the time of René 
Descartes (1596-1650) been aimed more at the Cartesian ego than at the traditional soul.
 Accordingly, it will be important here, before continuing on to the main topic of our discussion, 
to brieﬂy delineate the Cartesian account from traditional ideas about the soul for the two are often 
conﬂated. What Descartes accomplished was to change the emphasis of traditional ideas by shifting 
the focus from the soul (and much that that term implied in traditional thinking) to the ‘mind’ while 
still maintaining the overall idea of a pilot in a vessel, or, in more modern terms, a driver in a vehicle 
or (stretching it) a ghost in a machine. Descartes’ view itself was considerably more complex than this, 
however;5  to him one’s true self was the thinking thing, a thing which must be substantive as the acts 
of thought have to be based in something, and that substance was an intellectual substance, the pure 
intellect.6  Descartes ‘equated soul with mind and preferred the latter term to avoid ambiguity.’7 
In Cartesian thinking then the mind and body are wholly separate entities but clearly interact as is 
evidenced by sensations like pain or hunger being felt by ‘me’ (the mind) and not merely observed 
by ‘me’. The nature of this interaction, the manner in which the two communicated, and how the 
1  Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).
2  Barry Dainton, The Phenomenal Self (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
3  Galen Strawson, Selves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
4  For some examples see Glenn Wallis, trans. and comm., The Dhammapada: Verses on the Way (New York: The 
Modern Library, 2007); Asanga Tilakaratne, Theravada Buddhism: The View of the Elders (Honolulu: University 
of Hawai’i Press, 2012); Steve Hagen, Buddhism: Plain and Simple (New York: Broadway Books, 1999); and Alan 
Watts, The Way of Zen (New York: Vintage Books, 1989).
5  Descartes was the first major thinker to use the term ‘mind’ instead of ‘soul’ and saw the relation between the 
mind and body not exactly as a pilot and a vessel but one where ‘they systematically affect each other, but not 
other things, in ways that make the two of them together function as if they were one.’
John Barresi and Raymond Martin, ‘History as Prologue: Western Theories of the Self’ in The Oxford Handbook of 
the Self, ed. by Shaun Gallagher (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 33-56 (p. 39).
6  Gary Hatfield, The Routledge Guidebook to Descartes’ Meditations (Abingdon, OX: Routledge, 2014).
7  ibid., p. 124.
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mind was able to move the body, is not clear in Descartes’ account, and he was unable to adequately 
answer objections of this kind that were raised by contemporaries.8  It is also somewhat unclear on 
the Cartesian account what the nature of the intellectual substance is for it is arguable that, although 
immaterial, it is not necessarily immortal in the way a traditional soul has been thought to be. Does a 
Cartesian mind travel postmortem in the way that a soul does in its journey through the otherworld 
and/or back into this world again? Or does a Cartesian mind rather stop existing when the human 
body with which it was associated stops existing? Descartes himself wrote in such a way that makes 
the reader think he favored the former (though not, of course, the reincarnation option), although given 
the pains with which he sought to avoid displeasing the Church and thereby inviting harm to his 
person (given the historical context in which he wrote with the Inquisition still active) this may have 
been simply a means of protecting himself.9  The case therefore is, and will likely remain, an open one, 
but for our purposes here the distinction between the Cartesian account and the traditional one should 
be suﬃciently clear.
 How then ought we to understand the terms that form the current section’s heading? How 
does a ‘self’ diﬀer from one’s ‘personal identity’ and how does each of them diﬀer from a ‘whole 
person’? The answer is largely a matter of degree. The self in its realist sense is a mental entity or 
psychological datum that defines and informs a person’s ‘true nature’ or ‘core identity’, rooting 
all other psychological aspects. Anti-realist or non-realist accounts will on the other hand often use 
the terms ‘self’ and ‘personal identity’ interchangeably, illustrating the purported way in which 
the brain’s standard functioning gives rise to the notion of a self (some cognitive accounts have also 
suggested that the self may be rooted in the brain in a modular or functional manner10 ) but that such 
is merely that, an idea and nothing substantively further. Since the self does not exist on such accounts 
what appears to be the self may be discussed in the same manner as all other ‘merely’ psychological 
phenomena that play into one’s sense of identity. Personal identity then is either, on realist accounts, 
the self plus other psychological conditions (including one’s personality, traits, characteristics, goals, etc.), 
or, on anti-realist accounts, only those same psychological conditions. The whole person, in contrast, 
consists of personal identity (with or without the self) in addition to the kind of embodied issues that 
are raised by our physical features and physical aspects of being. To put it simply, if there is a self 
then it anchors personal identity and both of them plus the body yields the whole person; if there is 
no self then only personal identity plus the body yields the whole person. With these deﬁnitions and 
preliminary discussions in mind it should be clear the kind of background image that is raised when 
one speaks of a ‘self’, realist or not, and we may therefore turn now to the speciﬁc self-concept and its 
alleged foundation that this paper wishes to consider.
8  ibid.
9  Hatfield, op. cit.; on some thoughts regarding what else Descartes may have meant see Strawson, op. cit.
10 Readers interested in pursuing this avenue may wish to see António Damásio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, 
and the Human Brain (New York: Putnam, 1994) or Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (New York: Little, 
Brown and Co., 1991) to get started; Strawson, op. cit., also discusses cognitive theories, labeling them ‘brain-system’ 
views.
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2.	 Kristján	Kristjánsson’s	self-concept	and	claim	to	its	Humean	basis
 What is novel about Kristján Kristjánsson’s account, particularly given the current academic 
climate, is that it is realist about the self ‒ that it claims that there is in fact a substantive nature 
to selfhood without further making either the Cartesian ego or the traditional soul claims that we 
tend to associate with the realist stance. Kristjánsson ﬁnds the basis for his account in the work of 
David Hume, and although he admits that there is no consensus on the deﬁnitive way to interpret 
Book Two of Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature,11  Kristjánsson suggests that Hume ‘seems to be 
arguing that, whereas the self as a succession of related ideas and impressions cannot be a direct 
object for the understanding, the self of whose moral actions each of us is intimately conscious can 
be a direct object for our emotions’.12  Such a stance makes the self’s realism ‒ the sense in which it 
can be argued to be ‘real’ ‒ to consist of emotional activity and to thereby be generative of a self-
concept that is dependent on reinforcement from others via social interactions and societal rules and 
conventions regarding emotions. Put more simply, how we feel, how we are taught to feel, and how 
others make us feel all inform what is our substantive ‘self’. Although it is not entirely clear from his 
account just what Kristjánsson is driving at, he appears to be using Hume’s idea as a means of moving 
away from the Lockean concept of a self-account that is based on the continuity of consciousness and 
conscious access to memory (or at least the possibility of being able to consciously access memory 
(thus accounting for the breaks that we are experientially familiar with such as forgetfulness, sleep, 
and the like))13  and instead spring boarding to the alternative concept he wishes to promote that has 
the self as more properly based on one’s shifting emotions, subject to both personal reflection and 
societal support/censure, and using this interpretation of Hume to justify or ground the account. The 
self here, on this alternative account, is each person’s moral being, the day-to-day psychological unit 
of reference that we go by, akin to ‘the voter’ or ‘the citizen’ or ‘the taxpayer’; it is seeing oneself 
from an aﬀective and morally related point of view.14  Kristjánsson summarizes the self on this account 
as being composed of three sets of self-related emotions: 1 ) Self-constituting emotions: those that 
define us, our ‘core commitments, traits, aspirations or ideals’, 2 ) Self-comparative emotions: those 
that take the self as ‘an indirect object’ or ‘a reference point’ for ‘comparison with a baseline of 
expectations’, and 3 ) Self-conscious emotions: those that are in the self they’re about, that take the 
self as ‘their direct attentional and intentional object’. 15  The self here is that which we maintain as 
a personal psychological point of reference and that more or less matches what we mean when we 
speak of ourselves, it is the culmination of the creature performing the actions, thinking the thoughts, 
and having the feelings that we internally associate with those actions, thoughts, and feelings, and that 
others associate with them too. On this account there is no mental ‘pure ego’ that takes up residence 
11 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, intro. and ed. by David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1739/2000).
12 Kristján Kristjánsson, The Self and Its Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 47-48.
13 See Chapter 27, especially sections 11-12, ‘Of Identity and Diversity’ in John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding, 2nd edn (1689/1690). Available on Project Gutenberg: <http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/10615/
pg10615.html>. Accessed 08 August 2016.
14 Kristjánsson, op. cit.
15 ibid., pp. 75-77.
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in the physical body (the ‘psychological unit’ Kristjánsson refers to should be understood almost 
as a side effect instead of as the core that the ‘pure ego’ would be; note his comparisons to such 
deﬁnitional/functional terms as ‘the citizen’, ‘the taxpayer’). Rather the physical body, along with our 
unique sense of personal identity, is all that the self is and part of that body’s normal functioning is to 
have the emotion-based ongoing characteristics that make up Kristjánsson’s ﬁrst emotive set above 
and the self-referencing features of his second and third sets. Of note on this account is that our self-
concept as a moral being is particularly subject to the social; it can correspond to reality or fail to 
correspond, and it can be judged objectively through the lens of its quality as other-dependent in the 
public realm. Our daily interactions will either reinforce the way in which we see ourselves as being or 
they will show us where we have been in error.
 I think there are a number of problems with this account ‒ and a number of meritorious points as 
well ‒, but rather than dwell on each of them here (I have done so elsewhere16) I wish instead to focus 
purely on Kristjánsson’s interpretation of Hume as that is a foundational point for the self-concept as 
proﬀered and because I think that what I have to say on the matter may be diﬀerent enough from 
both Kristjánsson’s and from the traditional reading of Hume to perhaps be of some small interest. The 
paper will conclude with some avenues opened by Kristjánsson’s account that may nevertheless be 
worth pursuing.
3.	 Rereading	Hume
 The traditional interpretation of Hume has him as arguing that the self is nothing more than a 
constantly varying bundle of experiential input whose nature is bound up with one’s reﬂections on 
one’s states.17  Kristjánsson disagrees with this, as outlined in the preceding, and I, in turn, disagree 
with Kristjánsson’s reading of Hume. My own interpretation of the way that Hume presents the self 
understands his view as essentially equating the self with personal identity, which would not allow the 
self to have the deep realist foundation that Kristjánsson gives it and which does agree with the focus 
of the traditional reading of the Humean account as essentially being an anti-realist one though it goes 
further in the thickness (or richness) that it gives to the Humean self-concept. (One’s personal identity 
being more substantive than a ‘bundle of experiential input’ would allow; see Section 1 above.) In this 
section I will make my case for this reading of Hume by going back to the end of Book One in his A 
Treatise of Human Nature, in which personal identity is addressed directly (in 1 : 4 : 6) and then looking 
at all the places in Book Two where Hume refers to the self to try and understand what he meant by 
that. Prior to examining Hume’s quotes though we will need to give a brief background on his notion 
of the ‘double relation of ideas and impressions’ to see where Kristjánsson likely got the purported 
Humean basis for his emotional self as described above.
16 See Andrew Oberg, ‘A Realist Self?’, Journal of Applied Ethics and Philosophy, 7 (2015), 24-33; there are points that I 
would change about this paper but the overall critique of Kristjánsson’s self-concept found therein remains more or 
less in place in my mind.
17 Brie Gertler, ‘Self-Knowledge’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015 Edition), ed. by Edward N. 
Zalta. <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/self-knowledge/>. Accessed 08 August 2016
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 Hume’s system in Book Two depends on the aforementioned ‘double relation of ideas and 
impressions’ in which an idea of something (Hume gives the example of one’s own house) produces 
an impression (pleasure, assuming it is a nice house) but also correlates to another idea (my self, the 
owner of the house) that is connected with another impression (the pleasurable feeling of pride in 
owning something nice); this latter impression, it will be noted, resembles the earlier impression. The 
association of ideas here grants to one the idea of one’s self: ‘That is, the subject brings to mind the 
idea of precisely that individual who is always the object of pride.’18  It is probable that Kristjánsson 
took his notion of an emotionally generated self from this relationship, as he specifically references 
Book Two of A Treatise of Human Nature when he writes that Hume ‘seems to be arguing that, 
whereas the self as a succession of related ideas and impressions cannot be a direct object for the 
understanding, the self of whose moral actions each of us is intimately conscious can be a direct object 
for our emotions’.19  We must tread lightly here though as what Hume is presenting in his ‘double 
relation of ideas and impressions’ is not a theory of self but rather the common element to be found 
between a feeling and the various sources of that feeling, linked also to certain ideas (of which the self 
is one) via association. I believe that the standard anti-realist reading of what Hume understood the self 
deﬁnitionally to be is closer to what we can ﬁnd in Hume than Kristjánsson’s reading is.
 To see that we turn to what Hume actually wrote. In Book One Part Four Section Six (1 : 4 : 6 
‘Of personal identity’), he displays a skeptical general view in the following: ‘For my part, when I 
enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other
…When my perceptions are remov’d for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, 
and may truly be said not to exist.’20  To this he adds, ‘they [i.e. ‘we’, people] are nothing but a bundle 
or collection of diﬀerent perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are 
in a perpetual ﬂux and movement.’21  Here we have Hume’s famous ‘bundles’ concept, and with his 
foundation laid he summarizes his account thusly: 
identity is nothing really belonging to these diﬀerent perceptions, and uniting 
them together; but is merely a quality, which we attribute to them, because 
of the union of their ideas in the imagination, when we reflect upon them
…‘Tis, therefore, on some of those three relations of resemblance, contiguity 
and causation, that identity depends; and as the very essence of these relations 
consists in their producing an easy transition of ideas; it follows, that our notions 
of personal identity, proceed entirely from the smooth and uninterrupted 
progress of the thought along a train of connected ideas, according to the 
18 Hume, op. cit., Editor’s Introduction p. 151.
19 Kristjánsson, op. cit., pp. 47-48.
20 Hume, op. cit., Text p. 165.
21 ibid., Text p. 165.
22 ibid., Text pp. 169-170.
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principles above-explain’d. 22 
What Hume appears to be giving us here is an anti-realist account that equates the self (or, rather, 
sense of self) with personal identity and being dependent on psychological continuity; note that without 
perceptions ( i.e. psychological stimuli ) one ‘may truly be said not to exist’. Personal identity then, 
by its nature, makes us think that there is a self. Furthermore, on Hume’s account, this mistaken 
supposition is additionally supported by memory which discovers and helps produce our identity, 
aided by our emotions working with our imagination in linking present concerns with past and 
future,23  and by the idea of causation which allows us to take identity beyond memory and suppose 
the same identity even during forgotten times.24  Having established sufficient doubt in any realist 
concept of the self ( he supposes ), and having described what personal identity really is and why it 
erroneously makes us think there is a self resting beyond it, Hume concludes his thoughts with this 
gem of a statement: ‘all the nice and subtile questions concerning personal identity can never possibly 
be decided, and are to be regarded rather as grammatical than as philosophical difficulties.’25  We, 
however, may still have our doubts about just what Hume actually meant and so for the moment I 
ask only that we keep the preceding in mind as we turn to Book Two to see how Hume wrote of the 
self there and to try to ascertain if it is at heart an anti-realist account. If my reading of Hume is right 
and he does give to personal identity the weight that Kristjánsson wants a realist self to carry, then 
the self view on Hume’s account ‒ on its own based on what Hume writes about it ‒ may not be able 
to be ‘a direct object for our emotions’ as Kristjánsson has it. However, if we think that personal 
identity could be a direct object for our emotions, and I do not see why it could not, Kristjánsson’s 
core idea does still stand, but there is now within it a fatal flaw: although personal identity can 
(conceivably) be an object for one’s emotions it would not thereby generate a self able to underpin 
personal identity. This is important because, as remarked in the ﬁrst section above, the whole point 
of a realist self is to argue that the self is an entity or function (depending on how realist one wishes 
to be) that is more foundational and that ensures personal identity continues even when psychological 
continuity (/perceptions/memory) does not. Such reasoning would not, though, in itself mean that the 
self is necessarily non-existent (that is, anti-realist), nor would it mean that Kristjánsson’s self-concept 
is without value, it would only mean that Kristjánsson is mistaken in what he attributes to Hume. 
If reading Hume did give Kristjánsson his ideas about how a realist self could be established then 
certainly Hume does deserve the credit given him, I do not mean to object to that, perhaps just not in 
the way that Kristjánsson seems to be saying.
 The ﬁrst mention of the self in Book Two comes in Part One Section Two ( 2 : 1 : 2 ‘Of pride and 
humility; their objects and causes’) where Hume gives us a deﬁnition of the self that seemingly just 
substitutes the term ‘self’ for ‘personal identity’ as he previously summarized it: ‘Tis evident, that 
23 ibid., Text p. 170.
24 ibid., Text pp. 170-171.
25 ibid., Text p. 171.
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pride and humility, tho’ directly contrary, have yet the same OBJECT. This object is self, or that 
succession of related ideas and impressions, of which we have an intimate memory and consciousness. 
Here the view always ﬁxes when we are actuated by either of these passions.’26  This is followed by a 
statement that shifts the focus somewhat, moving back to perceptions (and not ‘ideas and impressions’) 
that closely matches Hume’s ‘bundles’ line quoted above: ‘But tho’ that connected succession of 
perceptions, which we call self, be always the object of these two passions, ‘tis impossible it can be 
their CAUSE, or be suﬃcient alone to excite them.’27  Following on along these lines of distinguishing 
between object and cause we have this thought, which appears to be the root of Kristjánsson’s reading 
of Hume: 
Pride and humility, being once rais’d, immediately turn our attention to ourself, 
and regard that as their ultimate and ﬁnal object; but there is something farther 
requisite in order to raise them: Something, which is peculiar to one of the 
passions, and produces not both in the very same degree. The ﬁrst idea, that is 
presented to the mind, is that of the cause or productive principle. This excites 
the passion, connected with it; and that passion, when excited, turns our view 
to another idea, which is that of self. Here then is a passion plac’d betwixt two 
ideas, of which the one produces it, and the other is produc’d by it. The ﬁrst 
idea, therefore, represents the cause, the second the object of the passion.28 
This seems clear enough; Hume here has the self as the object of the passion (the emotion) of pride 
or humility which was caused by an idea (say, of one’s house) and then via the related ideas raised by 
that rests on the idea of the self. Yet the self being described is just that, an idea, incapable of being 
a cause in itself, and given what Hume has previously written now reading a realist conception into 
this may not be entirely warranted. Interestingly, though, this passage does seem to suggest that the 
self (understood as personal identity) may not necessarily be tied to inner reﬂection as Hume is usually 
read to mean. It could be that Hume considered the passions to play into one’s personal identity even 
when one did not thereafter reﬂect all the way out to that personal identity (that is, down the chain of 
related ideas). If so then Kristjánsson’s alternative interpretation of Hume might have some merit to it 
though not, perhaps, to the extent that Kristjánsson claims. We continue our exploration.
 Part One Section Five ( 2 : 1 : 5  ‘Of the inﬂuence of these relations on pride and humility’) tells us 
that ‘’tis absolutely impossible, from the primary constitution of the mind, that these passions [pride 
and humility] shou’d ever look beyond self, or that individual person, of whose actions and sentiments 
each of us is intimately conscious.’29  The self now appears to be something more akin to a whole 
26 ibid., Text p. 182.
27 ibid., Text p. 182.
28 ibid., Text p. 182.
29 ibid., Text p. 187.
30 Quoted above: ‘[Hume] seems to be arguing that, whereas the self as a succession of related ideas and impressions 
cannot be a direct object for the understanding, the self of whose moral actions each of us is intimately conscious can 
be a direct object for our emotions’, Kristjánsson, op. cit., pp. 47-48.
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person, and we note too that this is the statement referenced by Kristjánsson when he gives the basis 
for his self-concept as Book Two of A Treatise of Human Nature.30  Then a little later in the same 
section Hume describes the self as an idea attached to pride, a ‘contrivance of nature’ like lust or 
hunger and their objects.31  This is not terribly helpful as the objects of lust and hunger are certainly 
very real (in contrast to how Hume has earlier described the self), yet the thrust here seems to be the 
notion of an idea necessarily attached to a passion, that you cannot have one without the other. The 
picture is now murkier as we ﬁnd in Part One Sections Six and Nine Hume making two further rather 
cryptic remarks about the self; in 2 : 1 : 6 (‘Limitations of this system’), he contrasts pride with joy, the 
former having two objects necessary to its production (the cause of pride and the self) and the latter 
having only one (the cause), although he admits that joy must have ‘some relation to self’ but such is 
only needed to ‘render it agreeable; nor is self, properly speaking, the object of this passion.’32  This 
seems to hint that joy can exist in the absence of a self, but if Hume’s account is anyway non-realist 
about the self then such would be perfectly possible while maintaining that the joy must be enjoyed 
by some living creature and not merely some thing (even though that enjoyer, the object, is not 
required for joy’s existence by this account). In 2 : 1 : 9 (‘Of external advantages and disadvantages’) 
Hume states that, ‘But tho’ pride and humility have the qualities of our mind and body, that is self, 
for their natural and more immediate causes’33  (he then notes that there are other causes which 
obscure the primary), suddenly seeming to introduce the body into the concept of the self, which, if it 
was important for Hume, would be something else entirely from his earlier ‘bundle’ of perceptions 
or series of connected ideas explanations. This is an isolated comment though and is not repeated, 
whereas in Part Two Section One (2 : 2 : 1 ‘Of the objects and causes of love and hatred’) Hume does 
repeat an earlier self deﬁnition, from 2 :1 : 5, writing that, ‘As the object of pride and humility is self or 
that identical person, of whose thoughts, actions, and sensations we are intimately conscious’.34  Here 
is our apparent whole person again; just what are we to make of all this? Taken with Hume’s earlier 
description of what personal identity is (an attribution we assign to our continuing perceptions (see the 
ﬁrst long quote above)) and how our perceptions generate the sense of self (again, that same attribution 
given to perceptions: personal identity = (sense of) self), which when absent (‘as by sound sleep’) leads 
to a condition equated with non-being (see the ﬁrst quote from 1 :4 : 6 above), gives a picture of the 
self that is either an illusion generated by perceptions (= personal identity)/the ﬂow of other ideas 
and impressions relating to the person who is their object, or is simply the whole person ‘of whose 
thoughts, actions, and sensations we are intimately conscious’ (but then who is the ‘we’ in that?). 
Kristjánsson seems to opt for the latter, perhaps considering the referenced ‘we’ to be his emotionally-
based realist self (that is, what it would really be; Hume of course did not have access to the account) 
although it is questionable if such would work in the sense carried by this ‘we’ given the picture of 
31 Hume, op. cit., Text p. 188.
32 ibid., Text p. 191.
33 ibid., Text p. 198.
34 ibid., Text p. 214.
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the self as a day-to-day psychological unit that Kristjánsson describes it as being. My own view is that 
judging just from the space Hume gives to each the whole person notion seems much less important 
to him (if indeed it was a separate concept and not merely a case of incautious writing35), and in both 
senses of the self as an illusion (via perceptions or via the train of other ideas) the view of the self is 
anti-realist and tied to psychological continuity. A realist self would require more.
 I should stress that this is only my reading of Hume and that it is diﬃcult to know exactly what 
he meant, but when what he does write about personal identity and the self is laid out in this way 
it seems clear that Kristjánsson’s interpretation is at least weaker than he claims. Granted, even if 
Hume’s self is an anti-realist one, as the traditional reading (and as my own) has it, the sense of self that 
develops in the way Hume describes could still be an object for emotional activity, and that it could 
be so does lend credence to Kristjánsson’s three self-related emotional sets. It is here, in fact, that my 
reading of Hume parts ways very slightly with the traditional interpretation as I can see how Hume 
might have considered there to be some sense in how a self/personal identity may continue even when 
not purposely reﬂected upon, and that such might therefore have more weight than has typically been 
given to the self on Hume’s account. Kristjánsson too may have simply wished to indicate that he used 
Hume as a jumping oﬀ point, but even so the problem of how the self stands in relation to personal 
identity in Kristjánsson’s self-concept remains, especially given our conclusion that in Hume’s account, 
as in many anti-realist accounts, the terms are interchangeable. Hume’s work may be an inspiration for 
a realist self-concept but it cannot be the basis for one.
4.	 Closing	remarks
 Where does this leave us? I ﬁnd Kristjánsson’s account to be an intriguing one and to possibly 
point to a way in which a realist basis could be found for the self that is understood in neither the 
sense of a soul nor that of a Cartesian ego. There may indeed be layers of realism within a realist 
concept and if such could be convincingly argued for then further alternatives to the realist/anti-realist 
dichotomy might well become attractive in studies on the self. We clearly approach our world and daily 
lives from the perspective of an enduring self or identity and for that reason alone the subject warrants 
much further investigation. Of particular interest in this regard might be the use of phenomenological 
methodology to augment whatever theoretical basis may be found for realist proposals.36  The question 
of the self may well prove to be an ultimately unanswerable one and it seems very likely to continue 
to perplex all those who take an interest in just what kind of creature we human animals are, yet its 
35 Although Hume does repeat this ‘case of incautious writing’ (if it was such), we should not be put off by that; he 
may simply have jotted down a note or referred back a few pages in his writing, keeping his focus on the main topic 
he was addressing and not worrying overmuch about exactly what he was saying about the self (perhaps because 
he considered the matter put to rest by his earlier investigations). At any rate, Hume’s text is not authoritative and 
all we are trying to find out is what he most likely had in mind when he wrote of the self; in answer to that the 
evidence seems to point to an illusion.
36 The account is far from complete but see again Oberg, op. cit. for a tentative start in this direction, as well as 
Andrew Oberg, ‘Dreaming of AI Lovers’ (forthcoming) for additional thoughts on the orientation such an account 
might take.
How realist was Hume’s self?: A critique of Kristjánsson on Hume（Oberg）  77
intractability should not deter us from its study for at heart this is a question of being and there can be 
no more foundational philosophical quest than being itself. If selves exist, how and in what way? Are 
selves necessarily tied to consciousness? Do nonhuman animals also have selves and if so do they diﬀer 
from our own or are they the same? Furthermore, do we have selves or are we selves? The questions 
are as important as the answers.
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